Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
twotalesanimation 81efab9cb0 Security hardening, DB connection fix, and handover documentation
Prepares the site for handover to the incoming committee. Three groups of
change: security fixes, a production stability fix, and documentation.

SECURITY

- upload_blog_image.php accepted unauthenticated uploads with no extension
  or MIME validation, into a web-served directory. Anyone could upload and
  execute a .php file. Now requires a session, checks blog ownership, and
  runs through validateFileUpload() with a new blog_image type.
- Added uploads/.htaccess and assets/uploads/.htaccess disabling the PHP
  engine, so an upload bypass still cannot execute. Force-added: .gitignore
  contains a bare .htaccess rule.
- blog/autosave.php updated posts by blog_id alone, letting any logged-in
  member overwrite anyone's post. Now scoped to the author, admin override
  retained. It also silently reassigned authorship to the editing admin;
  the existing author is now preserved.
- add_to_cart.php took item_price and user_id from POST, so drinks could be
  charged at any price to any member's tab, unauthenticated. Price and name
  are now looked up server-side from bar_items. Its require paths were also
  relative and broken.
- Session cookies now httponly/secure/samesite with strict mode, set in both
  .htaccess and .user.ini since php_flag and .user.ini apply under different
  SAPIs. The 30 minute idle timeout that login set but never checked is now
  enforced. Google login now regenerates the session id.
- Forced HTTPS. Required, because Secure cookies are never sent over plain
  HTTP and login would fail silently. LetsEncrypt acme-challenge is exempted
  above the redirect so certificate renewal keeps working.
- display_errors off; .htaccess now blocks *.log, error_log, .git and
  dotfiles. Debug logs containing member IDs, raw webhook bodies and payment
  signatures were publicly fetchable.
- Removed the IKHOKHA_BYPASS_SIGNATURE switch and the logging of raw webhook
  bodies, app IDs and signatures. Replaced a hardcoded personal Gmail
  recipient with the optional DEVELOPER_EMAIL variable.
- Added auth to fetch_users, fetch_bar_tabs, fetch_drinks, create_bar_tab and
  submit_order. Converted get_tab_total to a prepared statement.
- Tightened 11 mkdir(0777) calls to 0755.
- Fixed the validate_login rewrite, which pointed at a nonexistent path and
  only worked by falling through to the generic .php rule.

DATABASE STABILITY

openDatabaseConnection() opened a new connection on every call across 73 call
sites, and the server was hitting "Too many connections" in production. It now
returns one shared handle per request, reusing the connection connection.php
already opened. The 40 conn->close() calls in functions.php are removed, since
closing the shared handle breaks every later caller; PHP releases it at end of
request. A liveness check reconnects transparently if anything closes it.

Verified no function was lost (99 before and after), every removed close was
inside a braced block, and no transaction spans a helper that would open a
nested one.

DOCUMENTATION AND TOOLING

- docs/HANDOVER.md: operator guide covering architecture, routing, roles, the
  membership lifecycle, payments, backups, POPIA obligations, environment
  variables, known issues and a handover checklist.
- docs/FUNCTIONS.md: reference for the helpers in functions.php.
- scripts/backup.sh: nightly database and uploads backup, written outside the
  web root, with rotation and verification. Dumps are written to a temp file
  and only promoted after passing gzip, CREATE TABLE and completion-marker
  checks, so a failed run can never overwrite a good backup.
- .deployignore and .gitattributes added; .gitattributes pins LF on shell
  scripts and server config because core.autocrlf is true on Windows.
- Removed leftover debris: src/api/test_log.php and .htaccess1.

All 22 modified PHP files pass php -l. The backup script was tested against a
stub mysqldump for healthy, truncated and failing dumps, and for rotation.
Nothing was run against a live database or web server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 13:56:32 +02:00
twotalesanimation bc8d923221 Update site: auth fixes, new admin pages, payment flow, membership renewal, helpers 2026-06-11 10:01:48 +02:00
twotalesanimation 902291d8d1 Remove: Delete duplicate validate_login.php from src/processors - keep only root endpoint 2025-12-04 15:24:39 +02:00
twotalesanimation 1ef4d06627 Phase 1: Implement CSRF protection, input validation, and rate limiting
Major security improvements:
- Added CSRF token generation, validation, and cleanup functions
- Implemented comprehensive input validators (email, phone, name, date, amount, ID, file uploads)
- Added rate limiting with login attempt tracking and account lockout (5 failures = 15 min lockout)
- Implemented session fixation protection with session_regenerate_id() and 30-min timeout
- Fixed SQL injection in getResultFromTable() with whitelisted columns/tables
- Added audit logging for security events
- Applied CSRF validation to all 7 process_*.php files
- Applied input validation to critical endpoints (login, registration, bookings, application)
- Created database migration for login_attempts, audit_log tables and locked_until column

Modified files:
- functions.php: +500 lines of security functions
- validate_login.php: Added CSRF, rate limiting, session hardening
- register_user.php: Added CSRF, input validation, registration rate limiting
- process_*.php (7 files): Added CSRF token validation
- Created migration: 001_phase1_security_schema.sql

Next steps: Add CSRF tokens to form templates, harden file uploads, create testing checklist
2025-12-03 11:28:53 +02:00
twotalesanimation a103c5e272 dotenv implementation 2025-05-23 11:50:53 +02:00
Local Administrator b83134aca3 Initial commit 2025-04-18 10:32:42 +02:00